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I.  LAW’S INFLUENCE: “MOSTLY ILLUSORY”?  
The imposing honor of an invitation to respond to James Davison 
Hunter provided the welcome occasion to study his most recent book, To 
Change the World: The Irony, Tragedy, and Possibility of Christianity in the 
Late Modern World.1  As I made my way through Hunter’s iconoclastic 
work, I frequently found myself nodding in agreement, admiring the clarity 
of many of his insights, and anticipating the various arguments’ implications 
for this world of ours that is, on any honest accounting, thick with law.  The 
more I read, therefore, the more I wondered, especially as someone whose 
field is law, when Hunter would finally take up the topic of law, thematize 
law, and say how we are to use law—or not use it—“to change the world.”  
With one partial but important exception, however, Hunter hardly mentions 
 *  John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, and 
Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  This is a response to James Davison 
Hunter’s Law, Religion and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1065 (2013), and a part of 
Pepperdine University School of Law’s February 2012 conference entitled, The Competing Claims 
of Law and Religion: Who Should Influence Whom? 
 1.  JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, TO CHANGE THE WORLD: THE IRONY, TRAGEDY, AND 
POSSIBILITY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE LATE MODERN WORLD (2010). 
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law except several times in passing.2  The one partial exception covers 
approximately a page and a half in Essay II, Chapter 6, “Illusion, Irony, and 
Tragedy,” the essence of which can be fairly captured by the following two 
block quotes: 
The state can also address some of the legal and administrative 
aspects of these [i.e., social] problems and in this way either help or 
hinder the resolution of value-based problems.  Laws that prohibit 
discrimination against minorities are one important illustration of 
the constructive influence of the state.  And while politics can only 
do so much, it is also true that bad politics can do truly horrific 
things.  These are all good reasons to be involved in the work of 
creating and maintaining good government. . . .  What the state 
cannot do is provide fully satisfying solutions to the problem of 
values in our society.3 
A few sentences later, Hunter continues: 
At best, the state’s role addressing human problems is partial and 
limited.  It is not nearly as influential as the expectations most 
people have of it.  It is true that laws are not neutral.  They do 
reflect values. . . .  It imputes far too much capacity to the state and 
to the political process.4 
These are bold and contestable claims, and what Hunter writes next is 
important to assessing their truth value, but before unpacking the quoted 
language and continuing further with Hunter’s line of argument, it will be 
helpful to offer some real-world context providing a benchmark against 
which to measure Hunter’s argument, as well as my own competing 
argument. 
When I sat down in early January 2012 to write this response, the news 
was abuzz with stories about the new constitution of Hungary5 that the 
Hungarian Parliament approved by a 262 to 44 vote in April 2011 to take 
legal effect, as it did, on January 1, 2012.6  What made this especially 
 2.  I had nearly completed this response by the time I received Hunter’s paper.  Hunter’s paper 
ascribes greater efficacy to law than I found him ascribing to it in the book, an inconsistency worthy 
of exploration that I cannot undertake here.  Like the book, though, the paper never remotely 
considers the role for law that I develop in this essay. 
 3.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 171. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY] Apr. 25, 2011, 
translation available at http://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/alternative_translation_of_the_draft_ 
constituion.pdf. 
 6.  See Judy Dempsey, Hungarian Parliament Approves New Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/19/world/europe/19iht-hungary19.html. 
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newsworthy is the fact that Hungary’s new basic law is an explicitly 
Christian document.7  Repudiating that predominantly Catholic country’s 
Soviet-era constitution of 1949 (as amended in 1989), this new basic law 
begins with the following words “O Lord, blessed be the Hungarian nation” 
and proceeds to a formal “National Avowal of Faith” that declares in 
pertinent part: “We are proud that one thousand years ago our king, Saint 
Stephen, based the Hungarian State on solid foundations, and made our 
country a part of Christian Europe. . . .  We acknowledge the role 
Christianity has played in preserving our nation.”8  Article Q of the section 
entitled “Fundamentals” establishes that the National Avowal of Faith is no 
mere precatory throat-clearing, but rather that “[t]he provisions of the 
Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in accordance with . . . the 
Fundamental Law’s National Avowal of Faith.”9  The constitution prescribes 
a coat of arms topped by the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen I, canonized by 
Pope Gregory VII in 1083.10  The National Avowal further declares that 
“after the moral defeats of the twentieth century, our need for spiritual and 
intellectual renewal is paramount.”11  In keeping with that aim, Article II 
provides as follows: “Human dignity shall be inviolable.  Everyone shall 
have the right to life and human dignity; the life of the foetus shall be 
protected from the  moment of conception.”12  Article K(1) declares, 
moreover, that “Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage, understood 
to be the conjugal union of a man and a woman based on their independent 
consent; Hungary shall also protect the institution of the family, which it 
recognizes as the basis for survival of the nation.”13  And Article XV 
protects parental rights against state interference: “Parents shall have the 
right to choose the upbringing to be given to their children.”14 
Will this new law change the world?  Its opponents fear what those who 
enacted the law and the law’s other proponents hope and intend.  To take 
just three of countless possible examples, Human Rights Watch declared that 
“Hungary [is] at odds with its obligation to uphold and respect human 
 7.  New Hungarian Constitution Leads the Way, MUNDABOR’S BLOG (Apr. 26, 2011), 
http://mundabor.wordpress.com/2011/04/26/new-hungarian-constitution-leads-the-way/. 
 8.  MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE, supra note 5. 
 9.  Id. art. Q. 
 10.  Id. art. I. 
 11.  Id. at National Avowal of Faith. 
 12.  Id. art. II. 
 13.  Id. art. K(1). 
 14.  Id. art. XV(2). 
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rights.”15  Second, Neurope.eu reported that the new Hungarian constitution 
“offers the real prospect of banning both abortion and gay marriages, a 
concern shared by human rights groups.”16  Third, Amnesty International 
maintained that the Hungarian constitution “violates international and 
European human rights standards,” citing the clauses on fetal protection and 
marriage and the fact that sexual orientation is not covered by the 
constitution’s anti-discrimination clause.17  The culture did not suddenly 
shift on January 1, 2012, but the law did change.18 
Hunter’s book is not about Hungary: “The subject of these essays is the 
social imaginary that serves as a backdrop for the ways in which the 
majority of those in America who call themselves Christian engage the 
world.”19  Hunter’s claims about law’s limits are not so carefully 
circumscribed, however, as the following language demonstrates: “[L]aws 
cannot generate values, or instill values, or settle the conflict over values.  
The belief that the state could help us care more for the poor and the elderly, 
slow the disintegration of traditional values, generate respect among 
different groups, or create civic pride, is mostly illusory.”20  Taking the 
former of these two sentences first, it is not clear what Hunter means to deny 
when he asserts that laws cannot “generate,” “instill,” or “settle the conflict 
over” “values.”21  But this much is clear: The new Hungarian constitution 
will teach in favor of some conduct and against other conduct (law’s 
pedagogical function); it will encourage some conduct and forbid other 
conduct, including by rewarding some conduct and punishing other conduct 
(law’s ordering function); and it will do so definitively, at least for a time 
(law’s dispute-resolving function).  Those wishing to enter into same-sex 
marriage or to procure abortion will now have fewer opportunities to pursue 
 15.  Hungary: New Constitution Enshrines Discrimination, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 19, 
2011), http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/19/hungary-new-constitution-enshrines-discrimination. 
 16.  Cillian Donnelly, EU Asked to Intervene in “Worrying” Hungarian Constitution, NEW 
EUROPE (Apr. 10, 2011), http://www.neurope.eu/article/eu-asked-intervene-worrying-hungarian-
constitution. 
 17.  Hungary: Newly Adopted Constitution at Odds with Human Rights, AMNESTY INT’L (Apr. 
20, 2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/EUR27/006/2011/en/b528abb2-32a6-4615-858a-
5eeff13f369f/eur270062011en.html. 
 18.  See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  The Left has made a sport of attacking Hungary’s 
return to its Catholic roots.  See Marion Smith, Crusade Against Hungary, NAT’L REV. ONLINE 
(Mar. 5, 2012, 4:00 A.M.), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/292541/crusade-against-
hungary-marion-smith. 
 19.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 5. 
 20.  Id. at 171.  It is difficult to square the book’s resounding “mostly illusory” claim with the 
following claim by Hunter in his paper: “Law does the work that social mores used to do . . . .”  
James Davison Hunter, Law, Religion and the Common Good, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1065, 1080 (2013).  
I think the truth is somewhere in the middle.  Law does some of the work social mores used to do, 
nor, pace Hunter, do I consider this necessarily a bad thing, for reasons to which I come below. 
 21.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 171. 
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their preferences under this law in Hungary than under the laws that are 
common throughout the rest of Europe.22  It is thus at best an exaggeration to 
assert, as Hunter does in the second quoted sentence, that “[t]he belief that 
the state could help us . . . slow the disintegration of traditional values . . . is 
mostly illusory.”23 
II.  LAW, CULTURE, AND INSTITUTIONS 
Law and other state action do not spring from nowhere, of course, which 
is part of Hunter’s important thesis about the nature and workings of culture; 
they are conditioned by the entire ensemble of reasons people have for 
action, especially including institutionally entrenched and reinforced 
reasons.24  Sometimes laws are ignored, evaded, distinguished, or civilly 
disobeyed, but other times they are followed to the letter or with deep 
dedication to the purposes behind them.  I consider Hunter’s abstract, 
sweeping, and sparsely defended claims about law’s  inefficacy to be a non 
sequitur from his sound and more basic thesis that changing culture—
indeed, changing the world—is not just about changing minds and hearts, it 
is also about extensively changing institutions.  “[T]he key actor in history,” 
Hunter argues, “is not individual genius but rather the network and the new 
institutions that are created out of those networks.”25  One of the signal 
contributions of Hunter’s book is to illuminate the work of institutions in 
changing culture, though for reasons that will become clear later, I think he 
overlooks the institution that is necessary truly to change the culture for the 
better, and of course law determines, in major part, which institutions can 
exist and thrive. 
Hunter writes that “[l]egislation may be passed and judicial rulings may 
be properly handed down, but legal and political victories will be short-lived 
or pyrrhic without the broad-based legitimacy that makes the alternatives 
seem unthinkable.”26  Again, law’s efficacy is indeed affected by the culture 
from which it emerges, and a law that is too far out of step will fail to 
achieve the legislator’s intent.  And such failure, moreover, would represent 
a serious demerit on the part of the lawmaker, for it is the essence of the 
lawmaker’s function to move the people (toward the common good).   
 22.  See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
 23.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 171. 
 24.  Id. at 32–47. 
 25.  Id. at 38. 
 26.  Id. at 36. 
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I consider exactly wrong, however, Hunter’s further claim that law must 
render its alternatives “unthinkable.”  One of the things we know, indeed 
sometimes fear, about the lawmaker is that he (or they) often make a 
definitive choice among competing goods—things could have been other 
than they now will be.  It is the breathtaking distinction of the lawmaker that 
his rational choice enacted into law determines some of which goods the 
multitude will achieve and which it will not.  The availability of the 
corporate legal form, for example, determines how capital can be amassed 
and retained; as the advocates of campaign finance reform never tire of 
inveighing, it makes a real difference.  An alternative law may come later 
and repeal the former, and the eventuality of such a turn of events 
scandalizes no one, nor is the pro tempore efficacy of the former law 
necessarily reduced by this eventuality.  The U.S. Constitution is a very 
efficacious document, and its current efficacy is not reduced by the 
possibility of fervent prayers and other work on behalf of amendment and 
better interpretations.  
To conclude my first point, then, Hunter unjustifiably devalues the 
institutional role of the lawmaking state and the laws it can, if it chooses, 
make and enforce, thus changing the world.  Again, the lawmaker’s role and 
possibility of success are indeed contingent on a host of facts, but “mostly 
illusory” tout court?  That case has not been made in his book or his paper.  
On the contrary, and as I suspect Hunter would be among the first to 
concede, exactly what many find so very threatening about the state is, 
again, its capacity authoritatively to limit and shape through law the very 
choices we as individuals and members of communities can make about how 
we shall live. 
III.  LAW AND AUTHORITY 
I say I “suspect” Hunter would concede the preceding point because 
authority is not a concept Hunter pauses to analyze even as little as he 
analyzes the concept of law.27  Hunter assumes we know what authority is, 
or rather was, and asserts, in the context of his discussion of “The Challenge 
of Faithfulness,” that its sources are gone now: 
There are no fixed points of reference.  What is more, there is no 
authority that can be appealed to in order to definitively establish 
the meaning of words or to adjudicate which meaning is more 
truthful or better than another.  God?  Nature?  Science?  
Democracy?  Tradition?  None of these sources of authority can be 
 27.  See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:36 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1091, 2013] Making Nations Happy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1097 
trusted because each one exists under the same questioning gaze—
they too are words that have been emptied of meaning. 28 
Hunter thus proffers a menu of five “sources of authority” that are said to be 
no longer available, but what struck me immediately upon reviewing the 
menu is, first, how different among themselves the five items are and, 
second, how far each of them is from what I take to be the focal case of 
authority in traditional usage. 
As to the second point, it is common to define authority as legitimate 
power,29 and thus we refer to the civil ruling authority, to the teaching 
authority of the Church, and so forth, and by this we mean that each is a 
legitimate source of power, not a usurpation, a band of thieves, or a power 
grab.30  Hunter’s usage is non-standard, as a comparison of his five 
“sources” with the common understanding of authority as legitimate power 
reveals.  First, it is not common to refer to God as an authority; He is the 
sovereign because he is omnipotent.31  “Jesus came and told his disciples, ‘I 
have been given all authority in heaven and on earth’”32 and it is thus that 
from Him all authority comes.33  God is the source of authority, not a 
“source of authority” among others.34  This difference will be important to 
my argument later.  Second, nature is not a “source of authority,” not a 
source of power in need of being legitimated.  Nature is normative, if at all 
(as I believe it to be), simply by virtue of its hierarchy of ends, and, for that 
reason, persons in positions of authority can give just, coercive effect to that 
normativity.35  Third, science is not a “source of authority”; the modern mind 
commonly idolizes science as an alternative to authority.36  Next, democracy 
 28.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 206. 
 29.  See, e.g., BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, Dialectic of Authority, in A THIRD COLLECTION: 
PAPERS BY BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, S.J. 5, 5 (Frederick E. Crowe ed., 1985). 
 30.  See, e.g., BERNARD COOKE, POWER AND THE SPIRIT OF GOD: TOWARD AN EXPERIENCE-
BASED PNEUMATOLOGY 50 (2004). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Matthew 28:18. 
 33.  Romans 13:1 (“Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority 
except that which God has established.”). 
 34.  Id.; cf. MARK C. MURPHY, AN ESSAY ON DIVINE AUTHORITY 63 (2002) (exploring the sense 
in which the divine authority is contingent on the practical reasoning of individuals). 
 35.  I need to qualify my point by acknowledging that sometimes nature’s normativity is said to 
be a “natural authority.”  See Michael J. White, The Disappearance of Natural Authority and the 
Elusiveness of Nonnatural Authority, in CIVILIZING AUTHORITY: SOCIETY, STATE, AND CHURCH 21, 
21–33 (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2007). 
 36.  See JEFFREY STOUT, THE FLIGHT FROM AUTHORITY: RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE QUEST 
FOR AUTONOMY (1981). 
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is not a “source of authority”; democracy, as commonly understood, is 
majoritarian rule, allegedly based on the “consent”37 of the governed, and 
often celebrated, in fact, as no longer in need of reliance on authority such as 
that of the Magisterium of the Catholic Church.38  Fifth and finally, tradition 
is not per se a “source of authority,” though common usage is admittedly 
more varied in this case.  As commonly understood, tradition is the 
normative inheritance within which persons in positions of authority (and 
other persons) take decisions, and those decisions being infused and shaped 
by tradition is frequently said to make them authoritative.39 
To return to the first point mentioned above, then, Hunter has lumped 
together under the umbrella of “sources of authority” five very diverse 
phenomena, some of which are in fact, pace Hunter, “trusted” today in the 
world we inhabit.  That is, they provide the bases for individual and 
collective action that are sometimes regarded as good and sufficient, that is, 
legitimate.  The trouble is that the menu Hunter offers does not make it 
possible to specify the exact common element of “authority” that he claims 
has gone missing in the modern world.  Hunter’s claim seems 
underdeveloped.  To be sure, Hunter’s trope is familiar and, at a certain level 
of generality, commonplace.  Hannah Arendt long ago lamented the 
disappearance of authority from the modern world,40 and so constructive 
work on how to satisfy the conditions of authority in the modern world is a 
most worthy undertaking.41  It is not mere nit-pickery, however, to ask of a 
book that sounds an ominous warning about power—to which I am 
coming—that it specify exactly why brute power can no longer be made 
legitimate and thus be transmuted into authority.  In sum, by taking the 
concept of authority too easily, Hunter exaggerates or otherwise falsifies the 
problem of power. 
 37.  I put scare-quotes around consent because I consider it to be a dangerous fiction that the 
people either can or must consent to ruling authority.  Even John Locke, who championed the 
modern idea that government is based on the consent of the governed, was at pains to show how 
such a thing was plausibly possible.  See 2 H.R. FOX BOURNE, THE LIFE OF JOHN LOCKE 175 (1876).  
The better view is that “everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities.”  Romans 13:1. 
 38.  See RONALD INGLEHART & CHRISTIAN WELZEL, MODERNIZATION, CULTURAL CHANGE, 
AND DEMOCRACY: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SEQUENCE 26 (2005).  David Estlund argues that 
democracy derives authority from its ability to “tend” toward producing good decisions, but 
specifically denies that actual political decisions’ being good or correct is relevant to the question of 
authority.  Truth must be made “safe” for democracy.  DAVID M. ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC 
AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 24 (2008). 
 39.  See GUNNAR SKIRBEKK & NILS GILJE, A HISTORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT: FROM ANCIENT 
GREECE TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 313–14 (2001). 
 40.  Hannah Arendt, What Was Authority?, in AUTHORITY: NOMOS I, at 81 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 
1958). 
 41.  See, e.g., AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS (R. Baine Harris ed., 1976); GEORGE C. 
CHRISTIE, LAW, NORMS AND AUTHORITY (1982); RICHARD T. DEGEORGE, THE NATURE AND 
LIMITS OF AUTHORITY (1985); LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE (1988); JOSEPH 
VINING, THE AUTHORITATIVE AND THE AUTHORITARIAN (1986). 
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Before turning to Hunter’s warning about power, one further clue to 
what Hunter means by authority will be helpful, especially as it concerns law 
in particular.  Shortly after his lament about the disappearance of “sources of 
authority” that can be “trusted,” Hunter states the following by way of 
example of the phenomenon he has in mind, but has not defined: “Thus, in 
the field of literature such skepticism has come to reject the finality of the 
text or the authority of the author.  In law it has come to repudiate the 
immutability of constitutions and declarations and the legitimacy of law 
itself.”42  Hunter makes this claim as part of his larger claim about the 
disappearance of “sources of authority,” which disappearance is caused, so 
the story goes, by a certain sort of “skepticism” that, as it operates in or on 
law, disables “the immutability of constitutions.”43  To be sure, it is not open 
to reasonable doubt that there is more skepticism today than there once was, 
and there is no mystery concerning why this declension would reduce the 
availability of “authority” as commonly understood.  What Hunter has not 
established, however, is the significance of “repudiat[ing] the immutability 
of constitutions.”44 
What would it mean to assert that a particular constitution is 
“immutable”?  What individual or group has written such a thing?  And why 
would an allegedly “immutable” constitution be a good thing, as Hunter 
implies it would be?45  Given the incontestable fact that “knowledge makes a 
slow, if not a bloody, entrance,”46 a phenomenon from which the minds of 
framers of constitutions are not exempt, allegations of immutability—and 
that is all they can amount to, allegations—risk being a fig leaf for 
authoritarianism.  It is possibly an extension of this misplaced linkage 
between constitutionalism and immutability that leads Hunter to diagnose 
our culture, as he did in the language quoted above, with a repudiation of 
“the legitimacy of law itself.”47  Here again, I am afraid I do not see Hunter’s 
claim borne out in the real world.  The conspicuous and much-commented 
proliferation of law in our culture falsifies Hunter’s claim, and the fact that 
our many laws could have been different than they are does not, in my 
experience and observation, lead to skepticism about law’s legitimacy.  To 
be sure, there are out there a few of what H.L.A. Hart referred to as 
 42.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 207. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 186 (3d ed. 
1970).  
 47.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 207. 
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“disappointed absolutists,”48 those who are scandalized that there is no 
unbending rail that provides surety for judgments made in law.  But, for 
reasons to which I shall come, I judge such disappointment to be toto caelo 
preferable to the wooden worship of enshrined texts of human devising. 
IV.  WHITHER NATURAL LAW? 
 First, however, we must return to the progression of Hunter’s larger 
argument leading to the book’s defense of “faithful presence” as the path for 
Christians to take in order “to change the world” (though, as we shall see, 
without actually hoping to change that world in any particular way).  Earlier, 
I anticipated language of Hunter that is important for assessing the truth 
value of his claims about law’s promises being “mostly illusory.”  Here is 
that language: 
Values cannot be achieved politically because politics is invariably 
about power—not only power, but finally about power.  For politics 
to be about more than power, it depends on a realm that is 
independent of the political sphere.  It depends on moral criteria, 
institutionalized and practiced in the social order, that are 
autonomous from the realm of politics.  The problem is that the 
impulse toward politicization extends to the politicization of values.  
This means that the autonomy of moral criteria on which a higher 
practice of politics depends is increasingly lost.49 
Hunter elaborates with some examples: 
Today, most of the ideals and values that are discussed in public 
have acquired political content and connotation.  Fairness?  Equity?  
Justice?  Liberty?  These have come to have little or no meaning 
outside of the realm of politics. . . .  Decency, morality, hope, 
marriage, family, and children are important values but they have 
become political slogans. 50 
“The irony, of course,” Hunter continues,  
 48.  H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 139 (2d ed. 1994). 
 49.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 172.  I agree with historian Thomas Bisson that it is “inadvisable 
to follow recent social scientists and their adherents in referring to all relations of power as 
‘political,’ a usage not merely negligent of the classical etymology but also . . . oblivious to one of 
the salient shifts in the social experience of medieval power.”  THOMAS N. BISSON, THE CRISIS OF 
THE TWELFTH CENTURY: POWER, LORDSHIP, AND THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT 19 
(2009). 
 50.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 172. 
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is that no group in American society has done more to politicize 
values over the last half century, and therefore undermine their 
renewal, than Christians—both on the Right (since the early 1980s) 
and on the Left (during the 1960s and 1970s).  Both sides are 
implicated and remain implicated today.51 
The accusatory quality of these last words, the substance of which 
appears throughout the book in other formulations, cannot but cause the 
Christian reader—and others, of course—to sit up and pay attention.  Also 
arresting are Hunter’s immediately preceding condemnations of Christians’ 
willingness to let what they care about—that is, their “values,” as Hunter 
almost invariably refers to them—become ideological footballs on the field 
of politics.52  And truly bracing is Hunter’s positive thesis, which I shall 
repeat here: “For politics to be about more than power, it depends on a 
realm that is independent of the political sphere.  It depends on moral 
criteria, institutionalized and practiced in the social order, that are 
autonomous from the realm of politics.”53  But what are those criteria?  
Where do they come from?  How can they be, and why must they be, 
independent of politics?  Here again, as with his treatment of law and 
authority, what Hunter does not say performs almost as much work as what 
he does say, but I shall start by summarizing what Hunter does say in terms 
about those independent criteria that provide the basis of the “alternative 
way” Christians should take in the world. 
Hunter begins by affirming, thank God, that “goodness, beauty, and 
truth remain in this fallen creation.”54  Further, he explains: 
[P]eople of every creed and no creed have talents and abilities, 
possess knowledge, wisdom, and inventiveness, and hold standards 
of goodness, truth, justice, morality, and beauty that are, in relative 
degree, in harmony with God’s will and purposes.  These are all 
gifts of grace that are lavished on people whether Christian or not.55 
And “[t]here is more,” he continues: 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 231. 
 55.  Id. at 232. 
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As a backdrop to all of this [work of grace], there is a natural life 
originating in creation and a natural order in things that can be 
understood, developed, and enjoyed.  The dazzling processes of 
growth in a tree or a bug or a newborn baby, the intricacies of 
molecular biology, the stunning ordered-complexity of 
mathematics, and the underlying logic of music all speak of an 
order that God has created and that has not been effaced by the fall, 
that people can discover and take pleasure in as well.56  
The reader might at this point be tempted to conclude that the natural law 
will form a significant part of the basis of Hunter’s “alternative way” for 
Christians, but then Hunter drops a footnote: 
For my part, I take a minimalist view of “natural law.”  There are at 
least two problems with the maximalist view.  First, if the laws of 
nature were so obvious, why is it that so few see these laws?  The 
second reason is that much mischief has been done in the name of 
natural law, mischief that has legitimated political structures and 
social relationships that even the most conservative would now 
judge as not so natural.57 
This last implication, that being “conservative” (as opposed to what?) has 
something to do with the significance of admitting that humans have made 
mistakes about the contents of the natural law, is obscure.  Be that as it may, 
no respectable defender of the natural law cannot but agree with Jacques 
Maritain’s observation:  
That every sort of error and deviation is possible in the 
determination of these things [required by natural law] merely 
proves that our sight is weak and that innumerable accidents can 
corrupt our judgment. . . .  All this proves nothing against natural 
law, any more than a mistake in addition proves anything against 
arithmetic.58 
We need, then, to ask: What is the natural law and what are its contents?  
Is the natural law the same as “the laws of nature,” a term Hunter uses 
interchangeably, whereas in common usage they usually (though not always) 
have different referents?  Also obscure is the meaning of Hunter’s 
distinction between “maximalist” and “minimalist” theories or accounts of 
the natural law, except as a way of dismissing the importance of inquiring 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. at 332 n.9. 
 58.  JACQUES MARITAIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND NATURAL LAW 63 (1971). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/9/13  2:36 PM 
[Vol. 39: 1091, 2013] Making Nations Happy 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
1103 
into that law’s contents.59  “[W]hy is it that so few know these laws?” Hunter 
asks (rhetorically?).  Saint Thomas Aquinas pointed to the consequences of 
human sinfulness on our willingness to seek and our ability to know the 
natural law.60  He did not for that reason, however, understand humanity to 
enjoy a dispensation from seeking to know and follow the natural law.  
Hunter takes things entirely too easily with his casual assumption that the 
natural law is known by “see[ing].”  Bernard Lonergan has registered the 
disservice to worthy human living that is done by imagining that the hard 
work of human knowing is adequately conceptualized by an ocular 
metaphor.61  As I observed above (quoting Lonergan), “knowledge makes a 
slow, if not a bloody, entrance,” and this fact should not be transmuted into a 
justification for nescience.62 
In any event, an adequate account of Christians’ way forward in the 
world fairly deserves more than a four-sentence footnote devoted to 
dismissing or minimizing the contribution of the natural law.63  The natural 
law is not a Popish invention,64 though I eagerly admit to a Popish project to 
encourage theorizing about the divine natural law so as to increase our 
knowledge and understanding of it.  That said, I also think, for reasons to 
which I shall come, that due caution is in order about what we can expect 
from knowledge of the natural law, with a corresponding need for 
remedies.65 
This is not the place for a full-dress account of the place of the natural 
law in human lawmaking, but we do need to say just slightly more than 
Hunter has about that law exactly in order to provide a critical context for 
evaluating one of Hunter’s most startling claims.  On the classical account of 
the natural law rendered by Saint Thomas Aquinas, that law’s first precept is 
that the good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided.66  It is no 
 59.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 332 n.9. 
 60.  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE COMMANDMENTS OF GOD 1–3 (Laurence Shapcote trans., 
1937). 
 61.  LONERGAN, supra note 46, at 320, 416.  I am afraid Jacques Maritain, in the language quoted 
above, is guilty of the same oversimplification, but he is generally very attentive to epistemological 
complexity, though not in a way that would fully satisfy Lonergan. 
 62.  Id. at 186. 
 63.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 64.  The place of the natural law in Reformed social thought is well presented in DAVID 
VANDRUNEN, NATURAL LAW AND THE TWO KINGDOMS: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
REFORMED SOCIAL THOUGHT (2010). 
 65.  See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text. 
 66.  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I-II, q. 94, art. 2, at 43 (Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province trans., 2d ed. 1927). 
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oversimplification to say that humans are always to be acting for the good, 
and avoiding evil, for this is what God commands by the natural law.  
Human lawmaking itself is just one component of a fulfillment of the 
command to do and pursue the good and avoid evil.  Human laws are 
derived from the natural law, by way of specification or application, 
precisely in order to assist the community in achieving the common good 
and individual goods.67 
With this briefest of sketches in mind, consider the following claim 
Hunter makes a few lines from the end of the book: “By making a certain 
understanding of the good in society the objective, the source of the good— 
God himself and the intimacy he offers—becomes nothing more than a tool 
to be used to achieve that objective,” that is, the object to “change the 
world.”68  This warning comes as a part of Hunter’s larger warning against 
thinking that “the world . . . can be controlled and managed.”69   
Put that way (“controlled and managed”), who is likely to disagree?  But 
what Aquinas says is that it is the dignity of the human person that he can be 
provident for himself and for others.70  On all creation except the rational 
person, God’s providence works exclusively through causality.  On the 
rational person, however, God works not just through causality, but also by 
giving a law that the rational person is to follow in his freedom.71  Following 
that law means doing good in the world, or at least trying to do the apparent 
good.  Because the good always is particular, always concrete and not 
abstract, those following the natural law have no honest choice but to 
“mak[e] a certain understanding of the good in society the objective”72—not, 
however, as an alternative to God or to instrumentalize the Almighty, but 
exactly to obey His command and thereby to become the people He lovingly 
wills us to become, both in this life and in the next.  It is God’s will that we 
act for the temporal common good and the supernatural common good, and 
to do so is our glory, not our demotion to bureaucrats employed at a cosmic 
Dunder Mifflin. 
 67.  See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Law in a Catholic Framework, in TEACHING THE 
TRADITION: CATHOLIC THEMES IN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINES 437, 448 (John J. Piderit & Melanie M. 
Morey eds., 2012). 
 68.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 285. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  AQUINAS, supra note 66, q. 91, art. 2, at 11 (“Now among all others, the rational creature is 
subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of 
providence, by being provident both for itself and for others.  Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal 
Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the 
eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law.”). 
 71.  See JOHN RZIHA, PERFECTING HUMAN ACTIONS: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON HUMAN 
PARTICIPATION IN ETERNAL LAW 29–112 (2009). 
 72.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 285. 
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Hunter’s premature burial of the natural law does nothing less than hide 
essential workings of divine providence.  No doubt “much mischief” has 
come from mistakes about the natural law, but what possible warrant do we 
have to reduce the number of mistakes about a divine law by defiantly 
refusing to try to know it so as to live by it? 
V.  NATURAL LAW NOT ENOUGH 
But is knowledge of the natural law enough?  Not everyone thinks so.  
“[N]othing but the gospel of Jesus Christ will effect the mighty work of 
making nations happy.”73  Who is the author of this sentence from which my 
title borrows?  A Pope?  A theologian?  An unwashed theocrat?  No, 
Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a member of 
the Continental Congress, and the most eminent American physician of his 
day—and something of a theocrat (though I consider the word to be too 
prejudicial to be of much assistance), nonetheless.74  The preceding 
quotation is from a letter he wrote to John Adams.75  The following quote 
comes from a letter to Noah Webster in 1798: 
But Alas! my friend, I fear all our attempts to produce political 
happiness by the solitary influence of human reason, will be as 
fruitless at [as] the search for the philosopher’s stone.  It seems to 
be reserved to Christianity alone to produce universal, moral, 
political and physical happiness.  Reason produces it is true, great 
and popular truths, but it affords motives too feeble to induce 
mankind to act agreeably to them.  Christianity unfolds the same 
truths and accompanies them with motives, agreeable powerful & 
irresistible.  I anticipate nothing but suffering to the human race 
while the present systems of paganism, deism and atheism prevail in 
the world.76 
Every American child who has been instructed by the standard textbooks 
knows that he or she is expected to celebrate how our fabled Founders set 
 73.  GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 366 (1991) (quoting 
Benjamin Rush).  Section V of this article is deeply indebted to CHRISTOPHER A. FERRARA, 
LIBERTY: THE GOD THAT FAILED 509-11 (2012) (with a preface by Patrick McKinley Brennan). 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. at 430 n.59. 
 76.  Letter from Benjamin Rush to Noah Webster (July 20, 1798), in 1 NOTES ON THE LIFE OF 
NOAH WEBSTER 466 (Emily Ellsworth Ford Skeel ed., 1912).  I owe this citation to Christopher J. 
Ferrara. 
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out to create something without precedent in history, the Novus Ordo 
Seclorum.  In James Madison’s words, in Federalist No. 14, it was the glory 
of the people of America to have “accomplished a revolution which has no 
parallel in the annals of human society.  They reared the fabrics of 
governments which have no model on the face of the globe. . . .  If their 
works betray imperfections, we wonder at the fewness of them.”77  It was the 
Founders’ boast that the new order was to be founded on reason alone, not 
on the truths of Christianity.  Rush was not alone among the Founders, 
however, in giving the lie to what reason, unchastened and untutored by 
Christianity, can accomplish in politics.78  A number of the Founders came 
to doubt or even reject the possibility of a nation founded solely on reason.  
They include, in addition to Rush and Webster, John Jay, and Elias 
Boudinot.79 
I would not wish to be seen to be exaggerating the number of Founders 
who changed their mind about what they had wrought;80 I have not studied 
the question in detail, and the point is emphatically not to count noses—the 
question of God’s rightful place in politics in principle is precisely not a 
question to be answered by a majority vote.  It is interesting to observe, 
though, that the error in thinking that politics that makes men happy can be 
founded on pure reason was also apparent to an impressive but little-
remembered group known as the National Reform Association (NRA), a 
movement of conservative evangelical Protestant ministers, theologians, 
academics, lawyers, and jurists, mostly Presbyterians, beginning in the mid 
to late nineteenth century.81  During and after the Civil War, these men 
coalesced around the proposition that that war and many other social evils 
could have been avoided by a proper constitutional acknowledgment of God 
and the subordination of politics to divine law.  As legal historian John 
Witte, Jr., notes: “A reference to ‘the Year of our Lord’ sneaks into the 
dating of the instrument.  But nothing more.  The ‘Godless Constitution’ has 
been both celebrated and lamented ever since.”82  The members of the NRA 
were among the lamenters, and in 1874 they sought to remedy this capital 
defect in the Constitution.  In a memorial and petition they presented to 
 77.  THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison). 
 78.  WOOD, supra note 73, at 366. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  After mentioning Rush and the other names recorded above, Gordon Wood adds this: 
Many others, of course, never went that far.  But the numbers of old revolutionaries who 
lost faith in what the Revolution had done is startling: from James Warren and Samuel 
Adams to David Ramsay, Light-Horse Harry Lee, and Christopher Gadsden.  At the end 
of his life, George Washington had lost all hope for democracy. 
Id. 
 81.  I owe my familiarity with the NRA to Christopher A. Ferrara.   
 82.  JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: 
ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 61 (2000). 
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Congress, they proposed that the Constitution’s Preamble be amended to 
read as follows: 
We the People of the United States, [humbly acknowledging 
Almighty God as the source of all authority and power in civil 
government, the Lord Jesus Christ as the Ruler among the nations, 
his revealed will as the supreme law of the land, in order to 
constitute a Christian government,] and in order to form a more 
perfect union . . . .83 
Needless to say, the Preamble went unamended.  More interesting is how 
this group of Protestants had reached essentially the same conclusions that 
Catholics summarize under the mantle of the Social Kingship of Christ, 
namely, that inasmuch as Christ is God and king, the Gospel must undergird 
and limit the laws and institutions of political society.84  The NRA grasped 
the truth that the Church has taught all along, that it is incoherent to hold that 
only individuals, but not societies, are subject to divine law.  “Men living 
together in society are not less subject to God than they are as individuals, 
and civil society, no less than individual human beings, is in debt to God, 
‘who gave it being and maintains it, and whose ever-bounteous goodness 
enriches it with countless blessings.’”85 
Insightful though the NRA was about the need for the human juridical 
order to subordinate itself to the divine legal order, the movement was 
destined for terminal incoherence, and in ways that link up with Hunter’s 
argument on behalf of “institutionalized” presence as to how Christians 
should live in the world and, perhaps, change it.  Unable to identify any 
earthly spiritual authority higher than a (possible) consensus of human 
consciences, the NRA was reduced to advocating a Christian moral order 
determined by majoritarianism, which of course only reduplicates the 
problem of the mere majoritarianism of the Godless Constitution.  Orestes 
 83.  See FERRARA, supra note 73. 
 84.  The classic modern exposition of this doctrine is PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUAS 
PRIMAS (1925). 
 85.  ALFREDO CARDINAL OTTAVIANI, DUTIES OF THE CATHOLIC STATE IN REGARD TO RELIGION 
7–8 (Denis Fahey trans., Angelus Press 1993). 
Just as the individual human being, so too is the state bound by God’s moral law; the 
Church is the divinely appointed teacher and interpreter of this moral law, whose 
teachings and interpretations thereof are, therefore, binding on everyone, including the 
state—and, indeed, on principle and without exception, every state.  Just as the individual 
human being, so too is the state, in the final analysis, possessed of a supernatural last end. 
George W. Shea, Catholic Orientations on Church and State, 125 AM. ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 405, 
415 (1951). 
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Brownson, a renowned Protestant convert to Catholicism, had identified the 
problem already in 1845, and had offered what he regarded as the only 
solution available: 
The Protestant sect governs its religion, instead of being governed 
by it. . . .  Protestantism cannot govern the people,—for they govern 
it . . . .  The Roman Catholic religion, then, is necessary to sustain 
popular liberty, because popular liberty can be sustained only by a 
religion free from popular control . . . speaking from above and able 
to command them,—and such a religion is the Roman Catholic.86 
What Brownson contends is necessary to authentic human liberty, then, is 
what is sometimes celebrated under the label of Christendom, but more often 
condemned, as by Hunter, under such labels as “Constantinian error.”87  On 
the traditional Catholic account, the Church and state are united without 
being reduced either to the other, the Church being the conscience of the 
state and the soul of the body politic.  And the Church’s role as conscience is 
not limited to teaching the natural law authoritatively, but also to teaching 
the divine law authoritatively and to directing the state in matters that fall 
under the care and jurisdiction of the Church.  Authoritatively interpreted by 
the Church and taught to the state, the divine positive law—that is, the law 
of Moses and the law of Christ, not just the divine natural law—comes to 
provide the ultimate basis and limit of state action and human law, with high 
hope for the consequences for culture and society and, of course, ultimately, 
human happiness and the salvation of souls.88  Aquinas explains why it is 
necessary that the divine positive law was given even though the divine 
natural law had already been promulgated, and the reasons apply at least as 
much to states as they do to individuals: 
It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man’s assistance 
not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but also in 
those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded.  
Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as to the 
universal principles of the natural law; but through being habituated 
to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be done in detail.  
But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like 
 86.  Orestes Brownson, Catholicity Necessary to Sustain Popular Liberty, BROWNSON’S Q. REV., 
Oct. 1845, available at http://orestesbrownson.com/108.html (emphasis added).  Brownson did some 
occasional backsliding later.  See JOHN T. MCGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A 
HISTORY 43–49, 66–68, 88–90 (2003). 
 87.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 153. 
 88.  See E. CAHILL, THE FRAMEWORK OF A CHRISTIAN STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL 
SCIENCE (1932); Brian M. McCall, Consulting the Architect When Problems Arise—The Divine 
Law, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 117–28 (2011). 
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conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, 
the reason of many men went astray, to the extent of judging to be 
lawful, things that are evil in themselves.  Hence there was need for 
the authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both these 
defects.  Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things 
set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the 
Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as the 
Unity of the Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to 
which reason is liable.89 
The divine law provides a remedy for human failure to know the natural law, 
and the state has the proffered remedy at its peril. 
This, in brief, is neither more nor less than the traditional Catholic 
understanding of Church and state, and it provides an alternative 
institutionalized way for Christians to change the world.  Hunter’s church 
functions principally, if not exclusively, in diaspora.  On the traditional 
Catholic account, by contrast, the Church functions corporately as well as 
through the members of the body.  If someone should object that one hears 
very little about this traditional understanding from Catholics and from the 
Magisterium itself in recent years, I would demur, noting however that the 
Second Vatican Council unequivocally and authoritatively taught the 
following in Dignitatis Humanae, The Declaration on Religious Liberty: 
“The sacred Council . . . leaves intact the traditional Catholic teaching on the 
moral duty of individuals and societies towards the true religion and the one 
Church of Christ.”90 
 89.  AQUINAS, supra note 66, q. 99, art. 2, at 102. 
 90.  SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE [DECLARATION ON 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY] ¶ 1 (1965), available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/augustine/arch/vc2/dh.txt.  
Charles J. Chaput elides the issue of the state’s obligations to God this way: “For the framers, the 
new federal government had no authority in theological matters.”  CHARLES J. CHAPUT, RENDER 
UNTO CAESAR: SERVING THE NATION BY LIVING OUR CATHOLIC BELIEFS IN POLITICAL LIFE 85 
(2008).  Francis Cardinal George hews closer to the traditional account: 
The Catholic Church . . . has always insisted that civil law is not the highest law. . . .  
There is divine law . . . .  While this position is sometimes resented, the purpose of the 
civil society is to assist people to perfect themselves by properly promoting their various 
associations and then leaving them free to be faithful, according to a higher law.  
Cooperation between Church and state is therefore necessary in the creation of good civil 
laws. 
FRANCIS CARDINAL GEORGE, O.M.I., GOD IN ACTION: HOW FAITH IN GOD CAN ADDRESS THE 
CHALLENGES OF THE WORLD 83 (2011). 
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VI.  TRADITIONALISM, NOT NEO-CONSERVATIVISM 
“Most conservative Christians,” Hunter explains, “and certainly the 
more intellectually sophisticated,” he goes on to opine, “are not so explicit 
about making America Christian but rather speak in tones that are more 
inclusive and civil religious.”91  Indeed, most “conservative” Christians, as 
that term is used in contemporary American discourse, do speak that way, 
both Catholics and Protestants alike, alas.  There are others, though, among 
Catholics, who are not “conservative” in the already-mentioned sense, but 
“traditionalist,” a term Hunter uses several times, without ever defining it.92  
Traditional Catholics are not satisfied by the argument that the natural law, 
as understood by as many consciences as happen to be switched on at any 
given time, supplies the sufficient moral basis of the state, nor do they 
accept the principle of separation of Church and state.  These traditionalists 
share John Courtney Murray’s worry—though he was no traditionalist—and 
Brownson’s conviction that the Catholic Church’s authoritative moral 
teaching rooted in both the natural and divine laws and implemented by the 
state, thanks to a proper union between Church and state—that is, a union 
that respects both the integrity of each institution and the state’s dependence 
on the Church in matters over which she has jurisdiction—is necessary in 
order to correct and transform human nature and bring humans to natural 
and, ultimately, supernatural happiness.93  The traditionalist need take no 
 91.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 127. 
 92.  Id. at 85, 86. 
 93.  Murray worried about the possibility of success of the “political experiment of 
modernity”: 
The key to the whole new political edifice was the freedom of the individual conscience.  
Here precisely lies the newness of the modern experiment.  A great act of trust was made.  
The trust was that the free individual conscience would effectively mediate the moral 
imperatives of the transcendental order of justice (whose existence was not doubted in the 
earlier phases of the modern experiment).  Then, through the workings of free political 
institutions these imperatives would be transmitted to the public power as binding norms 
upon its action.  The only sovereign spiritual authority would be the conscience of the 
free man.  The freedom of the individual conscience, constitutionally guaranteed, would 
supply the armature of immunity to the sacred order, which now became, by modern 
definition, precisely the order of the private conscience.  And through free political 
institutions, again constitutionally guaranteed, the moral consensus of the community 
would be mobilized in favor of justice and freedom in the secular order.  This, I take it, 
has been in essence the political experiment of modernity. 
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN 
PROPOSITION 190–91 (2d ed. 2005); cf. BRAD S. GREGORY, THE UNINTENDED REFORMATION: HOW 
A RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION SECULARIZED SOCIETY 219 (2012): 
The creation of modern, liberal states as the institutional guarantors of individual rights 
might have avoided the subjectivization of morality if modern moral philosophy had 
succeeded in its principal objective: to discover or create a convincing secular foundation 
for ethics and thus for a shared moral community independent of inherited Christian or 
other religious beliefs.  But this did not happen, whether with respect to the good, human 
priorities, or right and wrong. 
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position on Hunter’s contention that “[e]ach and every faction in society 
seeks the patronage of state power as a means of imposing its particular 
understanding of the good on the whole of society,”94 but must counter that, 
first, the Church is no faction and, second, what is at issue is the divine right.  
Further, the traditionalist will agree with John Howard Yoder that the 
statement, “Jesus Christ is Lord,” is not a statement about inner piety,95 
but—what Yoder does not say—about the entire social order, for the 
traditionalist shares none of Neo-Anabaptism’s nor Radical Orthodoxy’s 
allergy to the state, but instead insists upon subordinating the state’s power 
to the Church’s spiritual judgment.96  Earthly order should indeed reflect, 
pace Hunter, a “heavenly order.”97  The call for it is no “myth,”98 but a 
divine command, fulfillment of which is assisted by the Church’s 
authoritative promulgation of the divine law.  Hunter uncritically shares the 
common assumption or conviction, as the case may be, that the legitimacy of 
the state is “from the people,”99 but, again, we have it on divine authority 
that “all authority is from God,” and it is for the authority of the Church to 
tell the state what moral principles should inspire its social activity and its 
legislation.100 
It is, I suppose, possible, though I rather doubt it, that the traditionalists 
are less rather than “more intellectually sophisticated,”101 but they do seem to 
 94.  HUNTER, supra note 1, at 106. 
 95.  Id. at 156 (quoting JOHN HOWARD YODER, FOR THE NATIONS: ESSAYS EVANGELICAL AND 
PUBLIC 24 (1997)). 
 96.  See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 161, 219. 
 97.  See id. at 64. 
 98.  See id. at 112. 
 99.  Id. at 102. 
 100.  Hunter quotes the late Richard John Neuhaus as follows: 
The audacious thing, the unprecedented thing, about the American regime is that it 
deliberately makes itself vulnerable to a higher sovereignty. . . .  The people, however, 
acknowledge a sovereignty higher than the sovereignty of the state.  And, in the 
American constitutional order, the state places upon itself a self-denying ordinance not to 
interfere with, not to try to direct or guide, not to establish whatever the sovereign people 
acknowledge as a sovereignty higher than themselves and higher than the state.  This new 
and audacious thing is called the free exercise of religion.  No other regime in human 
history had ever supposed that it is could deny itself the right to attempt to control what 
people believed about things most binding . . . . 
Id. at 113 (quoting Richard John Neuhaus, One Nation Under God, REFLECTIONS, Summer–Fall 
1994, at 1–7).  The nucleus of Neuhaus’s error here is the thought that the people are sovereign.  
Both individually and socially they are under divine law and claims of divine right, and when “the 
state places upon itself a self-denying ordinance,” id., what this amounts to is individuals jointly 
denying the divine right.  The framers had their reasons, we can suppose, but so did Judas. 
 101.  Id. at 127. 
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enjoy the support of Hunter’s observations and his argument that the current 
wars of the words rooted in unaided human reason and separation of Church 
and state are not getting the job done.102  Social atheism, such as is required 
by the U.S. Constitution, conduces to individual atheism. 
VII.  FROM LAW TO GRACE (AND BACK) 
  In conclusion, one can agree with Francis Connell, writing in 1948, that 
“[n]o one can be so optimistic as to believe that the ideal of a Christian state 
is going to spread throughout the world in the near future, apart from the 
extraordinary intervention of Divine Providence,”103 which, naturally 
enough, it is hard to discern on the horizon.  One can further agree with 
Connell, however, that “that should not prevent Catholics from proclaiming 
unhesitatingly the absolute necessity of a return to Christ on the part of 
governments as well as of individuals, if there is to be any lasting peace in 
the world.”104  This is a point Pope Benedict XVI never tires of making: 
[T]he world, with all its resources is unable to give humanity the 
light to guide it on its journey.  We find this in our day too: the 
western civilization seems to have lost its bearings and is navigating 
by sight.  Nevertheless the Church, thanks to the Word of God, sees 
through the fog.  She has no technical solutions but keeps her gaze 
fixed on the destination and offers the light of the Gospel to all 
people of good will, whatever their nation and culture.105 
Nothing but a lack of popular resolve prevents our Constitution from being 
amended or—and here one must be more careful than some Catholic authors 
are106—construed in accordance with the principles of the Christocentric 
political tradition.  It is the popular will, not the divine will, that is wanting.  
To be sure, a population that is not overwhelmingly Catholic would, of 
course, not view itself as having reason to establish a Catholic state, and, to 
be perfectly clear, it is the traditional Catholic view that “there is no 
 102.  Pope Benedict XVI, Solemnity of the Epiphany of the Lord: Angelus, Saint Peter’s Square 
(Jan. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Pope Benedict XVI, Angelus], available at http://www.vatican.va/ 
holy_father/benedict_xvi/angelus/2012/documents/hf_ben-xvi_ang_20120106_epifania_en.html.  
“The state must recognize that a fundamental system of values based on Christianity is the 
precondition for its existence.”  JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER, CHURCH, ECUMENISM, AND 
POLITICS: NEW ENDEAVORS IN ECCLESIOLOGY 207 (Michael J. Miller et al. trans., 2008). 
 103.  Francis J. Connell, Christ the King of Civil Rulers, 119 AM. ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 244, 252 
(1948). 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Pope Benedict XVI, Angelus, supra note 102. 
 106.  This is because it is a violation of the common good itself for public officials, such as 
judges, to exercise more authority than they have been designated by the people to exercise.  See 
Brennan, supra note 67, at 447–48. 
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subjective duty on the state’s part to accept and to profess the Catholic 
religion officially except where the existence of the objective obligation is 
recognized, in civil societies that may properly be designated as Catholic.”107  
Because that objective obligation is hardly recognized in the United States, 
the subjective obligation does not currently attach here.  But that is no 
excuse not to work toward conditions in which it would attach.  In a 
superabundance of caution I will add—though the point is not strictly 
relevant—that: 
The Catholic Church is unalterably opposed to the coercion of any 
man to join any religious group.  It includes in its own dogmatic 
teaching the pronouncement that no man may be forced or 
compelled to join even the true Church of Jesus Christ.  
Furthermore it is the manifest and perpetual teaching of the Catholic 
Church that no man may be persecuted because of his religious 
beliefs.108 
It bears underscoring: the Catholic Church is unalterably opposed to 
anyone’s or any group’s coercing any person to join any religious group. 
 Nonetheless, Catholics, along with other Christians, believe that the 
liberty offered by the Gospel is given for all peoples, and for that reason 
what they must never do is give up hope or fail to work for change that will 
favor the spread of the Gospel.  The freshness of the Hungarian constitution 
witnesses to why such hope is not irrational.  I will finish by quoting the 
words of Cardinal Pie of Poitiers (1815–1880), speaking at the grotto at 
Lourdes: “The supernatural is finished,”  Cardinal Pie quoted  nineteenth 
century man as boasting, and continued: “Well, look here, then!  The 
supernatural pours out, overflows, sweats from the sand and from the rock, 
spurts out from the source, and rolls along on the long folds of the living 
waves of a river of prayers, of chants and of light.”109  Mary Ann Glendon 
believes that we live on “the edge of chaos.”110  The way back from the edge 
 107.  Joseph Clifford Fenton, The Status of a Controversy, 124 AM. ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 451, 
452 (1951).  On the difficulties of determining when “the existence of the objective obligation has 
been recognized,” see A Statistical Escape from History, in E.A. GOERNER, PETER AND CAESAR: 
THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY 153, 153–72 (1965). 
 108.  Joseph Clifford Fenton, The Catholic Church and Freedom of Religion, 115 AM. 
ECCLESIASTICAL REV. 286, 297 (1946). 
 109.  John C. Rao, School Days, SEATTLE CATHOLIC (Mar. 15, 2005), 
http://www.seattlecatholic.com/a050315.html (quoting 11 HISTOIRE DU CHRISTIANISME 350 (J.M. 
Mayeur ed., 1995)). 
 110.  MARY ANN GLENDON, TRADITIONS IN TURMOIL, at xii (2006). 
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of chaos begins by allowing the supernatural full scope to correct and 
transform this fallen creation. 
 
